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Preliminary Statement of the Issue
Eighteen years after its highly anticipated inception, the International Criminal Court
(“ICC” or the “Court”) has failed to live up to the high expectations attached to it. This paper will
analyze the ICC’s role in relation to domestic courts, and how the principle of complementarity
impacts the Court’s role in international justice. This paper will argue that the Court needs to
embrace the concept of “Positive Complementarity” in practice, and not just in principal, in order
to fulfill the goals of the ICC. Specifically, the ICC must re-evaluate its’ role as an institution for
international justice and transition from a passive to a positive approach to complementarity. This
cannot be done through continued discussions by the Court, and legal scholars, on positive
complementarity generally. To the contrary, this paper will advance the argument that the ICC
must firmly and unambiguously adopt a policy of positive complementarity going forward if it is
committed to achieving the goals set forth at its inception.
Description of Problem
The Preamble to the Rome Statute declares that State Parties of the ICC are “[d]etermined
to put an end to impunity for the perpetrators of [the most serious crimes of concern to the
international community] and thus to contribute to the prevention of such crimes.”1 However,
international criminal law scholars have reflected that, “in reality, an offender has ‘about as much
chance of being prosecuted as winning the lottery.’”2 The ICC’s ineffectiveness is likely due to a

1

Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Preamble [hereinafter Rome Statute].
Lisa J. Laplante, The Domestication of International Criminal Law: A Proposal for Expanding the
International Criminal Court’s Sphere of Influence, 43 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 635, 640 (2010) (citing
Michael L. Smidt, The International Criminal Court: An Effective Means of Deterrence?, 167 MIL. L.
REV. 156, 188 (2001)).
2
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combination of factors, including a lack of resources, state’s unwillingness or inability to prosecute
international crimes within their judicial system, and the court’s complementary jurisdiction.
Statement of the Thesis
In order to maximize its effectiveness in the prevention of crimes, the ICC should adopt a
formal policy and apply the principles of positive complementarity with greater force to encourage
and assist States to undertake meaningful domestic prosecutions of international crimes. Under
this approach, “the ICC would cooperate with national governments and use political leverage to
encourage states to undertake their own prosecutions of international crimes.”3
Analysis
I. Introduction
A.

The ICC

The idea of an international tribunal for peace and justice has a long history.4 After decades
of conferences and discussions, the General Assembly of the United Nation’s tasked the
International Law Commission to consider establishing an international criminal court.5 In April
1998, a final draft to establish the ICC was completed, which became the basis for the Rome
Conference.6 On July 17, 1998, the Rome Statute was adopted by a vote of one-hundred and twenty

3

William W. Burke-White, Proactive Complementarity: The International Criminal Court and National
Courts in the Rome System of International Justice, 49 HARV. INT’L L.J. 53, 54 (2008) (discussing
positive complementarity).
4
KRISTINA MISKOWIAK, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: CONSENT, COMPLEMENTARITY AND
COOPERATION 12-13 (2000) (explaining that numerous attempts have been made since the 1870s to
establish and international criminal court but all failing).
5
Id. at 13.
6
Id.
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to seven, with twenty-one countries abstaining.7 The Rome Statute entered force on July 1, 2002
and the ICC was formally established.8
The ICC was established to prosecute the most serious crimes of international concern.9
While this is a laudable goal, the ICC limited its ability to prosecute these crimes to only three
situations: (1) where a state party refers the situation to the ICC; (2) where the U.N. Security
Council refers the situation to the ICC; or (3) where the Prosecutor initiates an investigation of
such a crime.10 This grant of jurisdiction is further limited by Article 17 of the Rome Statute, which
states that a situation is inadmissible to the ICC if it is already being investigated or prosecuted by
a State that has jurisdiction over it.11 This inadmissibility requirement is not absolute, because the
ICC regains jurisdiction over an issue if the State is unwilling or unable to genuinely carry out the
investigation or prosecution.12
B.

Complementarity

Article 1 of the Rome Statute articulates that the ICC will be complementary to national
jurisdictions.13 The Court’s complementary approach reflects the core belief that it must respect
state sovereignty and must not intrude on a nation’s control of the prosecution of crimes that occur
within their borders.14 Luis Moreno-Ocampo, the first prosecutor of the ICC, further explained the
theory of complementarity in one of his first speeches to the Court; “[t]he Court is complementary

7

Press Release, United Nations, UN Diplomatic Conference Concludes in Rome with Decision to
Establish Permanent International Criminal Court (July 20, 1998).
8
Coalition for the International Criminal Court, Our Story (http://coalitionfortheicc.org/about/our-story).
9
Rome Statute, Article 5. (Under this Article, the ICC has jurisdiction over: (1) crimes of genocide; (2)
crimes against humanity; (3) war crimes; and (4) aggression.).
10
Rome Statute, Article 13.
11
Rome Statute, Article 17.
12
Id.
13
Rome Statute, Article 1.
14
This approach also derives from the court’s recognition of its own limitations to investigate and
prosecute the most serious international crimes due to limited resources. See generally, Hitomi Takemura,
Positive Complementarity, MAX PLANCK ENCYCS. OF INT’L L., (2018).
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to national systems. This means that whenever there is genuine State action, the court cannot and
will not intervene…. The effectiveness of the [ICC] should not be measured by the number of
cases that reach it. On the contrary, complementarity implies that the absence of trials before this
Court, as a consequence of the regular functioning of national institutions, would be a major
success.”15
Complementarity was imagined as something more than a procedural requirement for the
Court; it was to be the very practice that enabled the ICC to work with its State Parties.
“Complementarity is not only a formal legal requirement of admissibility limiting the power of the
[Office of the Prosecutor (“OTP”)] but also a broader principle that allocates authority among
concurrently empowered institutions with differing levels of governance authority within the
international justice system.”16 This concept embraces a two-tiered approach: (1) States have the
initial responsibility to investigate and prosecute crimes identified in the Rome Statute within their
jurisdiction, while; (2) the ICC acts as a back-up court of last resort. This two-tiered approach
respects national sovereignty and places control of the judiciary within each sovereign. However,
the ICC’s role as a “back-up” weakens it as an institution to prosecute the most serious
international crimes. In fact, the very nature of complementarity has limited the ICC, and led to
many of its shortcomings in achieving its goals.
C.

Goals and Shortcomings of the ICC

The ICC was created with aspirations that far exceeded its potential given the limited legal
mandate of the Rome Statute and lack of resources. At its inception, the Court was said to

15

Luis Moreno-Ocampa, Prosecutor, International Criminal Court, Statement Made at the Ceremony for
the Solemn Undertaking of the Chief Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, at 3 (June 16, 2003).
16
Burke-White, supra note 3, at 79. See generally, Mohamed El Zeidy, The Principle of
Complementarity: A New Machinery to Implement International Criminal Law, 23 MICH. J. INT’L L. 869
(2002).
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represent, “the hope of governments from all around the world that the force of international law
can restrain the evil impulses that have stained history with the blood of innocent victims.”17 The
Court was established “not simply on the goal of giving particular defendants their deserved
punishments, but also on the broader aspirations that international trials will facilitate society-wide
transformation by breaking cycles of violence, delegitimizing criminal regimes and fostering
peaceful societies rooted in the rule of law.”18 ICC Judge Philippe Kirsch explained to the U.N.
General Assembly that “[t]he [ICC] was created to break the vicious cycle of crimes, impunity and
conflict. It was set up to contribute to justice and the prevention of crimes, and thereby to peace
and security… and to guarantee lasting respect for the enforcement of international justice.”19
However, due to self-imposed restrictions as a complementary court, and the ability to handle only
a limited set of cases, the ICC has failed to live up to these expectations.20
II. Why the ICC as it Currently Stands, is an Empty Promise of International Justice.
The ICC began with laudable intentions and high expectations; it offered hope, on the
international stage, to end impunity and bring justice to those effected by the most heinous crimes
committed. However, after almost two decades since its’ inception, the ICC has failed to establish
a record of holding people accountable. Worse, it has failed to bring meaningful change to
countries that are most affected by these acts. While it was unrealistic to believe that the ICC would
live up to all of its expectations, it was not unrealistic to believe that the ICC would establish itself

17

Lieutenant Colonel Michael A. Newton, Comparative Complementarity: Domestic Jurisdiction
Consistent with the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 167 MIL. L. REV. 20, 23 (2001).
18
Alexander K.A. Greenawalt, Complementarity in Crisis: Uganda, Alternative Justice, and the
International Criminal Court, 50 VA. J. INT'L L. 107, 128 (2009) (citing RUTI G TEITEL, TRANSITIONAL
JUSTICE 28 (2000)).
19
Philippe Kirsch, Address to the U.N. General Assembly, U.N. Doc. 3 (Nov. 1, 2007).
20
It should be noted that in regard to the cases that the ICC does take, there the ICC has contributed to
deterrence. However, when compared to the lofty goals at its inception, the ICC has not been able to have
the impact once imagined due to the limited cases it has heard.
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as a strong force on the international scale. Even this lower standard has proved too much.21 The
ICC has been hampered by a multitude of factors, including limited funding, political pressures,
and a lack of U.S. support. However, this paper will focus on the limiting principle of
complementarity, and how the Court’s current approach to complementarity has led to its failure
to reach its goals to date.
One of the inherent problems with the ICC’s complementary approach is that it can be
preempted by national jurisdictions.22 Thus, complementarity functions as a powerful tool for
states to “maintain control of criminal matters and the limit the reach of the ICC.”23 However, it
also functions as a powerful tool to keep the ICC out, and thus, prevent the prosecution of criminals
who are perpetrating crimes within a sovereign’s borders. For example, after the ICC announced
its’ intention to investigate crimes committed in Darfur, the Sudanese government established a
Court to prosecute the perpetrators of crime. While this could have been a significant step in the
direction of meaningful positive complementarity, “the Government’s own special court had
produced ‘discouraging results.’”24 “Given the timing of the creation of the new Sudanese
domestic courts and the government’s rhetoric, the new institutions appear to be a direct response
to the ICC’s investigation in an effort to block the admissibility of cases pursuant to Article 12

21

See e.g., Human Rights Watch, Human Right Watch Briefing Note for the Eighteenth Session of the
International Criminal Court Assembly of State Parties (Nov. 2019). Even the Human Rights Watch, a
strong supporter of the ICC, has stated, “performance gaps due to various factors have become very
evident, underscoring the need for changes in policy, practice, and state support.”
22
See Linda E. Carter, The Future of the International Criminal Court: Complementarity as a Strength or
a Weakness?, 12 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 451 (2013).
23
Id. See also Christine Bjork & Juanita Goebertus, Complementarity in Action: The Role of Civil Society
and the ICC in Rule of Law Strengthening in Kenya, 14 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. (2011) (“As a
permanent international mechanism of justice, the ICC is meant only to complement, not supersede,
national jurisdiction, and the principle of complementarity is the procedural safeguard that ensures that
the Court does not limit the sovereign rights of the State Parties.”).
24
UN NEWS, Sudan’s Special Court on Darfur Crimes not satisfactory, UN Genocide Expert Says (Dec.
16, 2005) https://news.un.org/en/story/2005/12/163972-sudans-special-court-darfur-crimes-notsatisfactory-un-genocide-expert-says.
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through a domestic prosecution.”25 This has been one of the key factors for why the ICC has been
so unsuccessful, and the basis for much of its criticism.26
Due to only a vague reference of complementarity in the preamble, with no further
reference or definition in the Articles, complementarity was originally interpreted to be applied in
the negative. Such an approach is reflected in the admissibility requirements of Article 17.27 This
negative approach creates a high barrier for admission before the Court, and a “relatively
unambitious vision of the Court.”28 This approach, stemming from States’ desires to protect their
sovereignty, turned the ICC into “an enforcement regime based on overlapping power between
territorial sovereigns (states) and non-territorial sovereigns (the international community as a
whole, represented by the ICC prosecutor).”29 The result of this approach has been an ICC with no
intention of engaging States.30 The Court’s negative approach to complementarity has also been
called “passive” complementarity.31 “Passive complementarity suggests that the ICC would step
in to undertake its own prosecutions only where national governments fail to prosecute and where
the Court has jurisdiction.”32 Notably, this approach stems from, among other things, the United

25

See Burke-White, supra note 3, at 72.
Id. at 54 (“The Court’s failure to use consciously its power to catalyze national prosecutions is a
potentially dangerous mistake. Neglecting the ICC’s political and legal power to encourage national
prosecutions of international crimes may well undermine the institution’s best hope to meet expectations
and enhance accountability.”).
27
Rome Statute, Article 17.
28
Laplante, supra note 2, at 643 (citing Allen J. Dickerson, Who’s in Charge Here? International
Criminal Court Complementarity and the Commander’s Role in the Courts-Martial, 54 NAVAL L. REV.
141, 141 (2007).
29
Id. (citing Newton, supra note 17 at, 26.
30
Ada Sheng, Analyzing the International Criminal Court Complementarity Principle Through a Federal
Court Lens, 13 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 413, 424 (2006) (“the Court can stay on the sidelines while the
national courts feel the burden of the Court’s watchful eye exhorting the State to do its best.”).
31
See Burke-White, supra note 3, at 56.
32
Id.
26

7

States’ reservations of creating a strong international court.33 Unfortunately, such an approach will
continue to limit the ICC’s reach. If the Court continues to take a passive approach, it will continue
to weaken its stature on the international stage, and eventually become completely ineffective.
As noted above, the ICC has jurisdiction over crimes of genocide; crimes against humanity;
war crimes; and aggression.34 Such atrocities are unfortunately most common in states with weak
or failing institutions. These states are often unable to maintain control of crime, or prosecute
crimes committed, due to events such as ongoing conflicts, widespread collapse of institutions,
and re-occurring atrocities. Unfortunately, complementarity – and the ICC generally – have
offered little opportunity for these countries.35 In 2016, six of the states under investigation by the
ICC were listed on the Fund for Peace’s Fragile States Index’s top twenty-five failing states;
additionally, two other states under investigation were on the “most worsened” list.36 All eight of
these states still remain on the Fragile States Index in 2020.37 Thus, the ICC has failed to strengthen
states who need it the most, those with failing institutions. This is due to the reserved role the ICC
and OTP have taken in regard to complementarity; the ICC dismisses cases from failing States to
be heard before the ICC under the relevant article of the Rome State,38 without making any attempt
to capacity build or strengthen the judicial institutions needed for justice within these States.

33

See Lawrence Weschler, Exceptional Cases in Rome: The United States and the Struggle for an ICC, in
UNITED STATES AND THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 85 (Sarah B. Sewall & Carl Kaysen eds.,
2000) (describing the compromise pushed by the United States that resulted in a weaker Court).
34
See Rome Statute, Article 13.
35
See generally, The Fragile States Index, The Fund for Peace.
36
Jacob N. Foster, A Situational Approach to Prosecutorial Strategy at the International Criminal Court
47 Geo. J. Int’l L. 439, 469 (2016).
37
The Fragile States Index, The Fund for Peace (2020).
38
See e.g., Rome Statute, Articles 5, 13, 17.
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This was seen in the case of Libya regarding Abdullah Al-Senussi, the head of Libya’s
military intelligence.39 Since the Arab Spring in 2011, Libya has consistently ranked among the
worst states on the Weak and Fragile States Index.40 Through a referral by the U.N. Security
Council, the ICC began an investigation into Al-Senussi. However, the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber
ultimately ruled that the case was not admissible before the ICC under the Rome Statute’s
complementarity principle.41 The Court’s ruling denied the argument made by the government of
Libya that this case presented “a unique opportunity for the Court to embrace the concept of
positive complementarity and to encourage other States emerging from conflict and mass atrocities
in pursuit of genuine national proceedings.”42 However, the Court declined to hear the case,
concluding that Libya was investigating “substantially the same conduct” as the ICC.43 The
Court’s failure to hear the case, and subsequent failure to engage Libya in capacity building, has
resulted in numerous other cases being submitted to the ICC from Libya.44 Thus, the ICC’s passive
approach to complementarity perpetuates international crime in weak and failing states.45
However, adopting a principle of positive complementarity in these states – and all states
impacted by international crime – will enable the ICC to encourage the development of the rule of
law, provide these States with judicial resources, and allow failing states to start holding their
leaders accountable.46 Further, positive complementarity offers a long-term solution; while change
39

Patricia Hobbs, The Catalyzing Effect of the Rome Statute in Africa: Positive Complementarity and
Self-Referrals, 31 CRIM. L. F. 345, 368 (2020).
40
See generally, The Fragile States Index, The Fund for Peace.
41
See Takemura, supra note 14.
42
Id. citing (Prosecutor v. Gaddafi and Al-Senussi, Application on behalf of the Government of Libya,
2013, 90-91, para. 200).
43
Hobbs, supra note 37, at 369.
44
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, The Situation in Libya, https://www.icc-cpi.int/libya
45
It is noteworthy that Al-Senussi’s trial before the Libyan judicial system resulted in a death sentence in
2015. Such a sentence does nothing to strengthen domestic institutions and exemplifies the flaws inherent
in the ICC’s passive approach to complementarity.
46
Katharine A. Marshall, Prevention and Complementarity in the International Criminal Court: A
Positive Approach, 17 No. 2 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 21, 21 (2010) (“By proactively engaging with and
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may not occur immediately, building a State’s domestic institutions will allow them to grow from
the ground up, and avoid future conflicts.47
III. The ICC Must Embrace Positive Complementarity to Transform the Court from a
Toothless Institution, to a Tool for Global Justice.
Adopting a policy of positive complementarity would allow the ICC to re-assess its
position as a weak international tribunal, and instead become a more effective legal institution
aimed towards bringing actors of international crime to justice and ending the impunity gap. While
positive complementarity raises concerns over resources and jurisdictional over-reach, a welltailored approach will allow the ICC to act within its legal mandate, allocate resources more
efficiently, and re-align the ICC to achieve the lofty goals the international community has set for
it. It should be noted, that nothing in this paper suggests that the ICC should outgrow its mandated
role on the international scale. Instead, the ICC needs to better adjust existing policies, in
accordance with its mandate, to implement a policy of positive complementarity.48
A.

Positive Complementarity

Shortly after the inception of the ICC, the OTP recognized that it is a limited institution in
terms of the number of prosecutions it can handle.49 As a result, in 2003, the ICC articulated a new

assisting domestic legal institutions, the ICC will be able to strengthen the rule of law in nations suffering
from violent conflict and instability.”).
47
Id. (“Positive complementarity encourages states to build and strengthen their domestic judicial
systems. A state with strong judicial institutions and respect for the rule of law is arguably less likely to
reach the level of societal upheaval in which international crimes are most often committed.”).
48
Any outgrowth of its current role would drastically expand its mandate, resources, and the will of State
Parties. This would be completely contrary to the vision that gave rise to the ICC in the first place, and is
not what this Paper suggests.
49
See generally Morten Bergsmo, The Jurisdictional Regime of the International Criminal Court, 4 EUR.
J. OF CRIME, CRIM. L., AND CRIM. JUST. (1998).
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approach to complementarity, one that has become known as positive complementarity.50 The
ICC’s commitment to positive complementarity was again reinforced by the 2006-2009
Prosecutorial Strategy Paper.51 In its 2009-2012 Prosecutorial Strategy Policy Paper, the OTP
identified positive complementarity as a “proactive policy of cooperation aimed at promoting
national proceedings.”52 Thus, based on the ICC’s early reports of Prosecutorial Strategy, positive
complementarity, as viewed by the OTP in its early stages meant, “that the OTP will encourage
genuine national proceedings where possible, relying on its various networks of cooperation, but
without involving the Office directly in capacity building or financial or technical assistance.”53
Due to the limitations of the ICC, the Court correctly realized that national investigations
and prosecutions would be the most efficient means to bring justice to perpetrators of international
crime.54 Unlike a passive approach to complementarity, positive complementarity “recognizes that
the ICC can and should encourage, and perhaps even assist, national governments to prosecute
international crimes.”55 This approach was articulated in the Office of the Prosecutor (“OTP”)’s

50

See Office of the Prosecutor, Paper on some policy issues before the office of the Prosecutor September
2003, which recognizes that domestic investigations and prosecutions are normally more effective and
efficient than ICC prosecutions.
51
Office of the Prosecutor, Report on Prosecutorial Strategy 14 September 2006 (announcing a “positive
approach to complementarity” whereby the OTP “encourages genuine national proceedings where
possible; relies on national and international networks; and participates in a system of international
cooperation.”) (citing Frederica Gioi, ‘Reverse Cooperation’ and the Architecture of the Rome Statute: A
Vital Part of the Relationship Between States and the ICC? In ICC AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION
IN LIGHT OF THE ROME STATUTE 75 (Maria Chiara Malaguti ed., 2007).
52
Milton Owuor, The International Criminal Court and Positive Complementarity: ASP Institutional
Framework, (2017) (citing Office of Prosecutor, Report on Prosecutorial Strategy, 1 February 2010).
53
Id. (citing R.S. Clark, Amendments to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court Considered
at the First Review Conference on the Court, 2 GOETTINGEN J. OF INT’L L., 687-711 (2010).
54
Burke-White, supra note 3, at 53 (“As a potential solution to this misalignment of expectations,
mandate, and resources, the ICC could participate more directly in efforts to encourage national
governments to prosecute international crimes themselves. This solution, predicated upon the ICC’s
ability to motivate and assist national judiciaries, could be termed ‘proactive complementarity.’”). Note
also that while Burke-White uses the term “proactive” complementarity, the term is often used
interchangeably, and for the purposes of this paper will also be used interchangeably.
55
Id. at 56.
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Paper on Some Policy Issues, which subsequently gave rise to the concept of “positive
complementarity.”56 Thus, the theory of positive complementarity is the idea that the ICC should
encourage state parties to engage in national prosecutions for international crimes where
possible.57 Under the theory of positive complementarity, the ICC’s preliminary investigations, or
threat to investigate, can serve as a catalyst for State Parties to comply with their obligations under
the Rome Statute to investigate and prosecute international crimes.58 Positive complementarity
would not just be a procedural principle governing admissibility, but a practical tool to strengthen
domestic judicial systems.59 It would allow the ICC to work alongside State’s to ensure successful
trials. Further, positive complementarity would develop State institutions; this would enable
State’s to effectively prosecute such crimes in national trials, as opposed to relying on the ICC.
If properly implemented, a policy of positive complementarity would “confer[] upon the
ICC a dual function.”60 Such a policy recognizes, as the Prosecutor’s Policy Paper discussing
positive complementarity did, that States are best suited to prosecute perpetrators of international
criminal law in domestic jurisdictions. Not only do the domestic courts have the best access to

56

OTP Paper on Some Policy Issues. This positive approach to complementarity was again articulated in
the 2006-2009 OTP’s Prosecutorial Strategy Paper whereby the OTP “encourages genuine national
proceedings where possible; relies on national and international networks; and participates in s system of
international cooperation.” Gioia, supra note 42.
57
See Assembly of States Parties, Report of the Bureau on Stocktaking: Complementarity, ICC-ASP
(Mar. 18, 2010) (“[P]ositive complementarity refers to all the activities/actions whereby national
jurisdictions are strengthened and enabled to conduct genuine national investigations and trials of crimes
included in the Rome Statute without involving the [ICC] in capacity building, financial support and
technical assistance, but instead leaving these actions and activities for States, to assist each other on a
voluntary basis.”).
58
Bjork, supra note 23, at 205. See also Carter, supra note 22, at 451 (“complementarity will prove to be
a strength if it leads to increased national capacity to adjudicate international crimes.”).
59
Id.
60
Burke-White, supra note 3, at 68. This dual function would be first for the ICC to encourage States to
undertake prosecutions themselves; but second, to directly prosecute crimes where States are unable or
unwilling.
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evidence and witnesses,61 and can offer the most cost-effective strategy for the ICC,62 but national
prosecutions have a greater potential to contribute to restorative justice.63 Thus, national courts are
simply better suited for prosecutions of international crimes. In recognizing the efficiency of
domestic judiciaries, and therefore utilizing the resources of national criminal courts, the ICC
would be able to focus on international crimes where it would be most effective, or where their
admissibility requirements are triggered when States are unwilling or unable to prosecute
themselves.64 This policy would not alter the ICC’s position as a court of last resort. Instead,
positive complementarity would still complement domestic jurisdictions, but would act to prevent
impunity gaps by proactively encouraging nations to undertake trials of lesser offenders.65
Colombia offers insight into how the ICC can successfully utilize positive complementarity
to encourage States to prosecute crimes where they are best suited. Colombia ratified the Rome
Statute in 2002; however, upon ratification, the Colombian government included a provision that
it would not accept ICC jurisdiction for war crimes for a seven-year period. 66 This provision
provided generous protection to paramilitary leaders in exchange for cooperation with the
government.67 As a result of these protections, the OTP informed the Colombian government of
the ICC’s potential interest in ongoing situation; however, the ICC did not open up a formal

61

ICC, OTP, Paper on Some Policy Issues before the Office of the Prosecutor, at 2 (Sept. 2003).
Burke-White, supra note 3, at 69.
63
Neil Kritz, Progress and Humility: The Ongoing Search for Post-Conflict Justice, in POST-CONFLICT
JUSTICE (M. Cheriff Bassiouni ed., 2002). See also BRUCE BROOMHALL, INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE AND
THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: BETWEEN SOVEREIGNTY AND THE RULE OF LAW 87 (2003)
(explaining that national proceedings have greater legitimacy among local populations and have “the
greatest impact in the eyes of society most immediately interested in them”).
64
See Burke-White, supra note 3, at 75-75.
65
Ideally, without a need for the ICC to step in.
66
Hobbs, supra note 37, at 366 (2020) (noting Colombia ratified the Rome Statute in 2002, adding a
provision, however, that it would not accept the jurisdiction of the ICC for seven years).
67
See Burke-White, supra note 3, at 89 (discussing the laws passed in Colombia giving paramilitary
leaders generous protections in exchange for cooperation).
62
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investigation.68 As a result of this communication, the Colombian Constitutional Court struck
down the provision offering protections to perpetrators of international criminal law “to better
address various human rights concerns.”69 Thus, through communication with government
officials, the ICC was able to catalyze domestic action in Colombia through the threat of further
investigations. This interaction exemplifies the power the ICC has to encourage domestic
prosecutions and avoid having to prosecute crimes at the ICC.70 In January, 2020, the ICC
concluded its’ mission in Colombia, without bringing a case to the ICC, but ensuring Colombia
was equipped to handle prosecutions going forward.71
i.

Legal Framework

There is no explicit legal basis for positive complementarity in the Rome Statute.72 In fact,
the legal admissibility requirements of Article 17 imply a passive approach to complementarity.73
However, nothing in Article 17 restricts or limits the prosecutor from taking a more positive
approach to complementarity.74 Thus, due to an absence of any statutory bar from engaging in
positive complementarity, the ICC can and should take a more positive approach to national
prosecutions.

68

Id. at 90.
Id.
70
See Hobbs, supra note 37 (“This initial OTP interest in the Colombian situation was followed by the
country’s credible attempts to conduct their own investigations and prosecutions, which in turn led the
ICC to carefully scrutinize the legislative changes introduced by Colombia. This was followed by years of
discussion and interaction between the OTP and Colombia, as well as an evaluation into whether
Colombia was doing enough to secure the prosecution of the alleged perpetrators.”).
71
Press Release, The Office of the Prosecutor concludes mission to Colombia, THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT, Jan. 23, 2020).
72
Contra complementarity generally.
73
Rome Statute, Article 17.
74
Rome Statute, Article 17. Instead, the plain text simply limits the ICC from prosecuting when a genuine
national investigation or prosecution has already begun (or concluded).
69
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Article 53 also offers insight into the potential for incorporating a positive complementarity
approach. Article 53(4) allows the Prosecutor to re-evaluate his or her decision to initiate an
investigation based on new facts.75 Thus, Article 53 exemplifies that if positive complementarity
were to work properly, then the ICC would be able to decide against an investigation if the State
at issue took the threat of an investigation seriously.76 Conversely, if the ICC decided against a
prosecution, and the state’s national prosecution was a sham trial, the ICC would be able to
reconsider its position in order to force a domestic prosecution by threatening an ICC investigation
or prosecution. Article 54 also provides a legal basis for positive complementarity.77 Article 54
vests within the Prosecutor the power to seek the cooperation of the State under threat of
investigation and to enter into agreements with the state to ensure such cooperation.78 This grant
of power to seek cooperation affirms the Rome Statute’s legal basis for positive complementarity
to encourage domestic prosecutions of international crimes through ICC support.
The legal basis for positive complementarity is also implied from Article 93 of the Rome
Statute. Specifically, Article 93(10)(a) allows the ICC to “cooperate with and provide assistance
to a State Party conducting an investigation into, or trial in respect of, conduct which constitutes a
crime within the jurisdiction of the Court or which constitutes a serious crime under the national
law of the requesting State.”79 This Article, although usually left out of the conversation about
positive complementarity, offers the strongest support for the ICC to embrace the concepts
discussed in this paper. Under Article 93, the ICC should work to strengthen domestic jurisdictions
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by actively engaging with States where international crimes have occurred. This will give the ICC
a more prominent role in the prosecution of these crimes, while also supporting States to build
judicial capacity. If done properly, and consistently, then this approach will position the ICC as a
catalyzing force for domestic prosecutions, as opposed to a mere back up court.
ii.

Institutional Framework

Given the implicit legal framework for the ICC to adopt a stronger policy of positive
complementarity, an analysis of the Court’s institutional framework is also warranted. Such an
analysis shows that a policy of positive complementarity is directly in line with the ICC’s goals,
and would enable the ICC and OTP to achieve these goals. “The benefit of [positive]
complementarity is that it can leverage the Court’s limited resources to fulfill the purposes of the
Rome Statute and more fully meet expectations through the activation of national judiciaries.”80
The legal mandate given to the OTP, expressed in Article 12,81 and Article 17,82 indicate that
investigating and prosecuting international crimes where States fail to do so themselves is the
ICC’s primary mandate.83 The ICC is statutorily restricted in reach to what it can legally prosecute.
However, the ICC, as an institution, has the capability to catalyze domestic trials, which would
have the indirect effect of ensuring that State parties prosecute criminals not within the reach of
the ICC, thus closing the impunity gap in accordance with the ICC’s preamble.
The limited resources given to the ICC poses a second institutional problem which has
resulted in the Court’s failure to achieve its goals. However, positive complementarity offers a
solution to this problem. Positive complementarity allows the OTP to encourage national trials,
which shifts the cost of prosecution from the ICC to the State. Further, by limiting its docket, the
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ICC would also reduce costs associated with trying multiple case. While investigations and trials
before the ICC inherently cost money, the threat of investigations and trials does not. Direct lines
of conversation with states, as provided for in Article 54, would enable the ICC to utilize its
institutional power to force domestic trials. This approach would also allow the ICC to reduce its
costs and therefore utilize its resources for cases where States are truly unable or unwilling to
prosecute. Thus, it would not only strengthen domestic judiciaries by encouraging them to
prosecute crimes themselves but strengthen the ICC by allowing it to more adequately utilize its
resources to prosecute trials where necessary.
Positive complementarity also allows the ICC to act in a more situational role, as opposed
to attempting to achieve its mandate with broader actions. A situational approach to positive
complementarity will prevent the ICC from expending resources in situations where the State is
unlikely to provide accountability. To the contrary, the ICC would be able to prioritize its resources
in situations where national proceedings are a viable option. Where national proceedings are a
viable option, positive complementarity offers its strongest chance of positive change.84
iii.

Reluctance to Fully Embrace Positive Complementarity

Despite the growing trend amongst legal scholars to embrace positive complementarity as
an effective tool to strengthen the ICC, it should be noted that it is not universally endorsed. In
fact, the Court itself has stated that it should not “become a development organization or an
implementing agency.”85 The Court echoed these concerns in the Bureau’s 2012 Report on
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complementarity.86 Thus, the Court recognizes its strong interest in developing national capacity,
but believes it should facilitate, as opposed to being a primary actor, in promoting these
developments.87 Two considerations underly the ICC’s reluctance to engage in a more proactive
role. First, the Court is concerned that doing so would compromise the impartial nature of the
ICC.88 Second, more involvement means more costs, and the ICC and ASP have both been hesitant
to expand their operations to more costly endeavors.89 Despite these considerations, there is
sufficient reason to believe that the Court can truly become a model for positive complementarity.
In doing so, it would apply an even-handed approach to State parties, thus limiting any concerns
of impartiality.90 Further, positive complementarity is not in conflict with the ICC’s resource
limitations, because it recognizes that enabling and eventually catalyzing State parties to prosecute
crimes in domestic courts will allow the ICC to expend less resources.
B.

How to Successfully Implement Positive Complementarity

Although the OTP and ASP have endorsed the idea of positive complementarity, the ICC
has yet to actively embrace and pursue this approach.91 However, there are several approaches the
ICC should adopt in order to implement a policy of positive complementarity, and thus align the
ICC’s strategy with its lofty goals.92
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First, the ICC can help developing nations who are willing to prosecute criminals but may
not have the best legal systems in place, by providing access to information. This option is cost
effective, and within the ICC’s mandate. In fact, the ICC has already started the Legal Tools
Project, an online database with legal documents and research that is available to the public.93 This
project was highlighted at the stocktaking exercise during the Review Conference of the Eighth
Session of the Assembly of States Parties.94 There, the conference noted that such a tool would
work to strengthen national jurisdiction and enable them to address core international crimes, two
key goals of positive complementarity.95 This approach would be especially helpful in states that
have limited resources.96 Starting with the Legal Tools Project, the ICC should work to expand
State’s access to resources. One problem with domestic judiciaries in weak and failing states is
their lack of resources to actually prosecute criminals due to failing legal institutions. If the ICC
were to provide all States parties with adequate legal resources, then states would have a stronger
baseline level of knowledge to prosecute individuals, thus strengthening their ability to conduct
trials.
Second, the ICC should formally adopt – and promote – a policy of positive
complementarity. This would allow the ICC to create a track record of investigating and
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prosecuting crimes within the court’s jurisdiction. Thus, the threat of investigation would
strengthen the ICC’s reputation, and create the catalyzing effect that is currently lacking.97 This
strategy, while potentially in conflict with the ICC’s budgetary limitations, would impose nonfinancial costs on the State at issue that would increase the catalyzing effect of a threat to
investigate.98 Therefore, when these non-financial costs outweigh the political costs of domestic
prosecution “the threat of ICC intervention may encourage domestic judicial systems to prosecute
international crimes themselves.”99 If implemented properly, the Court would strengthen its
position on the international scale by impacting a State’s decision to fulfil its obligations to
prosecute international crimes under the Rome Statute. This would in turn create a deterring effect,
preventing future atrocities from happening again.100
This approach is exemplified by the ICC’s intervention in Sudan. In 2005, the U.N.
Security Council referred the situation in Sudan to the OTP. Thereafter, the OTP announced he
would begin an investigation into the allegations.101 Immediately following this announcement,
the Sudanese government announced the establishment of special domestic tribunals to prosecute
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perpetrators of international criminal law in Darfur.102 Less than one year later the Darfur Special
Court was created, and committees tasked with prosecuting these crimes were formed.103
Such an approach would also legitimize the ICC, and international criminal law as a body
of law. Instead of being an obscure legal institution with a weak track record of successfully
closing the impunity gap, the ICC can become a model of international criminal law and
governance. If a track record of prosecutions – both at the domestic and ICC level – through the
policy of positive complementarity is developed, the ICC will be viewed as an institution that can
empower states with a history of international crime to prosecute crimes domestically. This will
indirectly allow the ICC to encourage states to institute change not just within their judicial
systems, but with their core institutions.104 “In this way, the ICC [will become] ‘a political tool to
cultivate national responses, rather than a rigid enforcement mechanism.’”105 While this approach
does risk the ICC overstepping its mandate, it could be done in a way to avoid this issue. The
clearest example of how this can be done is simply through a threat of prosecution. If the ICC
establishes a strong record of prosecuting crimes, then simply threatening States with an
investigation will allow the ICC to influence national responses to international crimes because
countries will be more likely to prosecute crimes nationally, as opposed to allowing the ICC to
take over the prosecution, if they know that the ICC’s threat is not baseless.106 Additionally, if the
State does initiate a prosecution, but the ICC later deems it to be insufficient, the OTP can re-
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evaluate the Court’s position pursuant to Article 53(4).107 Thus, this approach would allow the ICC
to utilize a catalyst method, but also ensure legal recourse if it is not successful. Further, this
approach recognizes that the ICC must adopt a long-term strategy in regard to positive
complementarity, because it cannot exert this level of influence immediately.108
Unfortunately, the most heinous crimes of international law occur in states that are
unwilling or unable to prosecute international crimes due to the failing institutions of the State,
and where the ICC is unable to intervene. In such a situation, the threat of an ICC investigation is
unlikely to provide meaningful results because the State is not in a position to actively partake in
a domestic trial. This situation is both the most-resource-intensive and offers the highest possibility
for failed assistance. Despite these risks, the ICC’s ability to influence these states through positive
complementarity would become its greatest accomplishment to date because it would end the
cyclical need for monitoring states that are continuous violators of international crime. Here, the
ICC could consider resource sharing initiatives, such as the Legal Tools Project discussed above;
adopting best practices to be applied to judicial systems with re-occurring violations; or more
hands on approaches, such as providing direct assistance to these States, or engaging in domestic
judicial reform.
While these approaches could potentially produce meaningful change to States that are
repeat violators of international crimes, an alternative approach to positive complementarity 109 –
mobilizing existing networks such as NGOs and State Parties – could enable the ICC to effect
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permanent change. This role would position ICC as an indirect source of catalyzation by
organizing NGOs and other actors to help capacity build within failing nations.110
While States and NGOs have positioned themselves at the forefront of capacity building,
the ICC should engage in a more positive approach to complementarity to further this endeavor.111
Capacity building “is understood as the strengthening of national jurisdictions in order to be able
to oversee national investigations and prosecutions at a suitable level, and to cooperate with the
court.”112 Under this view, capacity building and positive complementarity seek to achieve a
similar goal – strengthen domestic institutions so national judiciaries become capable of
prosecuting crimes of international law within their judicial systems, as opposed to the ICC. In
fact, forms of positive complementarity, “may entail legislative assistance, technical assistance
and capacity building, and assistance in terms of constructing physical infrastructure.”113
Moreover, if the ICC’s success is to be measured by fewer cases as a result of more domestic
prosecutions, as the first Prosecutor endorsed,114 then the ICC must embrace the idea of capacity
building as a policy of positive complementarity. This approach would be similar to that employed
by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the Special Court for Sierra
Leone.115 It would involve the ICC taking a more engaged approach, including both outreach and
capacity building simultaneously with its traditional mandates under the Rome Statute.
110
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C.

Positive Complementarity and the Impunity Gap

In April 2002, after the Rome Statute was officially ratified, the Secretary General of the
United Nations, Kofi Annan declared that, “the long-held dream of a permanent international
criminal court will now be realized. Impunity has been dealt a decisive blow.”116 However,
eighteen years later, the ICC has failed to live up to these expectations.117 Article 1 of the Rome
Statute states that the ICC “shall have the power to exercise its jurisdiction over persons for the
most serious crimes of international concern.”118 However, absent from this mandate is the power
to prosecute lesser offenders. An impunity gap arises where an international court, such as the ICC
or other tribunals, successfully prosecutes those who are most responsible for the core international
crimes; however, lesser offenders, who still should face prosecution under the Rome Statute and
other international treaties, are left unpunished.119 Thus, the issue of the impunity gap is inherent
within the ICC’s structure. This is due to the fact that the ICC’s mandate only addresses the
prosecution of the most serious actors.120 There is no mention of how the ICC should approach
lesser actors. Notwithstanding this problem inherent in the Rome Statute, a system of positive
complementarity, where the ICC undertakes the prosecution of high-level offenders, while
domestic trials prosecute lower-level offenders, would offer a strong solution to this problem.121
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Thus, while the ICC has focused only on the crimes within its mandated authority, positive
complementarity would allow national judiciaries to prosecute those responsible for lesser crimes
at a more effective rate. Additionally, given the ICC’s nearly global mandate, and the limited
resources it has been given, it will be impossible for the Court to prosecute even a small minority
of individuals who commit the four core jurisdictional international crimes. Thus, a system of
positive complementarity relieves the court of such a heavy burden and can lead to a larger
prosecution rate.
The ICC’s failure to close the impunity gap despite its mission to do just that, has not gone
unnoticed. However, despite the ICC’s shortcomings thus far, it still remains best suited to confront
such an ambitious goal.122 While the approaches noted above would indirectly lead to a lesser
impunity gap, other approaches directly focused on this goal have also been advanced. For
example, the ICC could establish an impunity index, to allow States to focus their resources on
where impunity arises, what causes it, and successful cases of States combatting this problem.123
While the ICC has not, to date, established such an index, it has begun to compile information on
these topics. However, it still lacks a clear direction to implement resources to close the impunity
gap.
The ICC has failed to build upon Secretary General Kofi Annan’s bold declaration in 2002
that impunity “has been dealt a decisive blow.”124 This failure is in part due to the language in the
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Rome Statute, that creates an inherent basis for the impunity gap to exist. However, adopting a
formal policy of positive complementarity will help fill the gap. Such a policy will enable the ICC
to focus on the most serious criminals of international crimes, in accordance with their mandate,
while encouraging domestic judiciaries to prosecute lesser perpetrators. This will effectively close
the impunity gap, while working around the inherent flaws of the Rome Statute.
IV. Conclusion
A policy of positive complementarity would require the ICC to actively engage domestic
jurisdictions through various means, ultimately catalyzing State parties to prosecute international
crimes in domestic trials. This approach offers the ICC the strongest avenue for achieving the goals
it has thus far failed to accomplish. Additionally, by encouraging State parties to engage in more
domestic prosecutions, the ICC would position itself to fulfill one of its core missions, ending the
impunity gap. This can best be achieved by collectively working with States in a shared manner
that will allow the ICC to prosecute the worst offenders while domestic jurisdictions agree to
prosecute those who should not go unpunished. By developing a strong track record of
prosecutions, the ICC will be able to achieve these goals with the threat of an investigation where
States are able but unwilling to prosecute.
While this Paper lays out multiple ways to implement positive complementarity, not one
is capable of achieving the goals set by the ICC and the expectations given to it. Taken together,
the ICC should adopt a wide range of policies that further the capabilities of positive
complementarity.
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